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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007)
After Duke Energy Corporation replaced or redesigned some of its
coal-fired electric generating units, the United States sued the owner of the
electric plants for violations of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), and
environmental groups intervened as plaintiffs. The case was originally
heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, and the defendant plant owner was granted summary judgment.
On appeal, the fourth circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Plaintiffs then
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
The Supreme Court considered whether the EPA was required to interpret
"modification" the same in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD") section of the CAA as interpreted in the section governing the
New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS").
The Clean Air Act was amended in the 1970s by the NSPS and
PSD. Each modification of the CAA covers modifications to old sources
and new sources of air pollution. The NSPS defines a "modification" as a
physical change or a change in the method of operation that increases the
amount of pollutant discharged or emits a new one measured in Kilograms
per hour. The PSD requires a permit before a "modification" can take
place and refers to "modification" as defined under the NSPS. Despite this
cross-reference in the statute itself, the EPA's regulations interpret the
term modification differently under the two sections. Under NSPS
regulations, a source must use the best available pollution-limiting
technology when a modification would increase the discharge of
pollutants. Under the PSD regulations, the source only has to get a permit
and use the best available pollution-limiting technology when the
modification is major. Under the PSD a modification is considered major
when it would increase the actual annual emission of a pollutant above the
actual average for the two prior years.
In this case, Duke Power had proceeded with modifications to its
plants under the PSD without permits, claiming that the modifications
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were not major based on hourly emission rates. However, the plaintiffs
asserted that because the modifications were designed to allow the electric
producing units to run longer each day that an hourly emissions standard is
the wrong standard under the PSD. The defendant's argued that
modification under the PSD must be interpreted the same as modification
under the NSPS because of the specific referral back to the NSPS in the
PSD definition of modification. Essentially, the defendants argued that the
hourly increase standard should be applied as required under the NSPS
instead of an annual emissions rate. The Supreme Court held that because
the PSD serves a different purpose from the NSPS the EPA has the
authority to interpret the term "modification" differently in the two
sections. The court remanded the case to the District Court with the
instructions that the PSD definition of "modification" could be interpreted
as an annual increase in pollution rate rather than an hourly rate increase
as defined under the NSPS. The court left for the district court to decide
the question of whether the EPA should be precluded from enforcing the
regulations of the PSD because the EPA had allowed Duke Power to
proceed inconsistent with its own regulations for twenty years.
BROCK H. COOPER
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
U.S. v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rv. Co., 479 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
2007)
Under
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, federal
and state governments can clean up hazardous waste sites and later sue
potentially responsible parties for reimbursement. In 1983, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the California State
Department of Toxic Substances Control ("DTSC") separately
investigated an agricultural chemical storage and distribution facility in
Arvin, California to determine whether repeated leaks and spills had
caused soil and groundwater contamination. Finding several violations of
hazardous waste laws, the agencies proceeded to clean up the site and in
doing so incurred substantial cost.
In 1996, the United States, acting through the EPA and DTSC
brought a CERCLA suit against Brown & Bryant, Inc., owner and
operator of the facility; Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway and
Union Pacific Transportation Co. ("Railroads"), part landowners of the
facility; and Shell Oil Company, distributor of the agricultural chemical
products involved. The district court determined that the harm sustained at
the site was capable of apportionment and apportioned the harm between
the Railroads as "owners" and Shell as an "arranger." B & B was
insolvent. For the Railroads, the district court multiplied the percentage of
ownership, percentage of time owned in relation to total operations, and
fraction of hazardous products attributable to the Railroads' parcel to
determine that the Railroads were liable for 9% of the total cleanup costs.
For Shell, the district court multiplied the percentages of leaks attributable
to Shell to determine that Shell was liable for 6% of the total cleanup
costs. Both parties appealed the judgment: the EPA and DTSC arguing
that the Railroads and Shell are jointly and severally liable for the entire
judgment, and Shell arguing that it is not an "arranger" under CERCLA
and therefore not a party on whom any cleanup liability can be imposed.
Whether CERCLA liability is joint and several versus severable is
an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit followed its sister circuits, relying heavily on U.S. v. Chem423
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Dyne, Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), and held that liability
may be joint and several at the liability phase (thus allowing for
apportionment of liability). Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately
determined that the harm suffered at the Arvin site was capable of
apportionment, it disagreed with the district court's method of
apportionment.
The test used by the Ninth Circuit to determine if apportionment
was proper was whether the Railroads and Shell had submitted evidence
sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the apportionment of liability.
Regarding the Railroads, the Ninth Circuit found that the factors the
district court used (percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types
of hazardous products) bore an insufficient logical connection to the
pertinent question: what part of the contaminants found on the land in
question were attributable to the presence of toxic substances or to
activities on the Railroad parcel? The Ninth Circuit rejected the district
court's apportionment calculation and held that the Railroads had failed to
prove a "reasonable basis" for apportioning liability. With regards to
Shell, the Ninth Circuit found that because the appropriate consideration
for apportionment is contamination, by presenting evidence of leakage
Shell failed to prove whether its chemicals that were leaked had
contaminated the soil in any specific proportion as compared to other
chemicals spilled at the site. The Ninth Circuit held that Shell's evidence
concerning leakage was insufficient to prove a "rational basis" for
apportionment of liability.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Shell
was an "arranger" for purposes of CERCLA. On appeal Shell claimed that
the district court used the wrong standard in determining whether it was an
"arranger," that the "useful product" doctrine precludes imposition of
"arranger" liability on Shell, that Shell lacked ownership and control over
the chemicals at the time of the transfers, and the district court erred when
it determined Shell contributed to the groundwater contamination. The
Ninth Circuit rejected Shell's arguments, finding that an entity can be an
"arranger" even if it did not intend to dispose of the product (under
CERCLA, dispose can mean spill); the "useful product" doctrine does not
apply where the sale of a useful product necessarily and immediately
results in the leakage of hazardous substances; Shell had sufficient control
over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to be considered an
424

"arranger" under CERCLA; and the record was sufficient to support the
district court's conclusion.

AMY L. GLEGHORN
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K.C.1986 Ltd. Partnership v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2007)
A superfund site in North Kansas City, Missouri, the Armour Road
Superfund Site ("Site"), had been contaminated by herbicide blending and
packaging operations. The Site was occupied by four different entities
from 1929 to the present. The current owner of the site filed a CERCLA
suit against the former occupants of the contaminated site to allocate
cleanup costs. Finding that each of these parties substantially contributed
to the contamination of the site by their own independent actions, the
district court allocated the clean up costs and determined which parties
were entitled to reimbursement for costs that already were incurred.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded in part. The
court first considered "whether the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to amend the allocation order before final judgment was entered
to credit the pretrial settlements obtained by one of previous owners from
the EPA and private entities against the judgment." CERCLA provides
that a judicially approved government settlement, such as the previous
owner's settlement with the EPA, "does not discharge any of the other
potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the
potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement." Although
CERCLA governs only the effect of settlements with the government and
not the settlements with private parties, the court noted that "general
equitable principles remain in play." As a general principle in a
contribution claim, CERCLA directs the court to "allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
appropriate" and "articulates a policy against double recovery." Thus, the
court found that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to credit
the settlements obtained by the former operator of the herbicide blending
facility on contaminated property against the final judgment.
In regards to the argument that the district court erred by awarding
prejudgment interest, the court held that "demands of defendants were
sufficiently specific to put other parties on notice of amounts at issue and
to support accrual of prejudgment interest from dates of such demand."
The court reasoned that although the former operator did not demand
specific amounts from each defendant, specific amounts of money were
named and the case involved only a handful of third-party defendants who
were related in some way to each other.
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When considering an individual's liability as an "operator," the
court looked at the authority to control the handling and disposal of
hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme. After
finding that the individual was directly responsible for devising the
procedures for the use and disposal of hazardous waste and had authority
to make necessary decisions involving large expenditures by the company,
the court found the individual liable as an "operator" under CERCLA, and
thus liable for the release of hazardous substances.
The successor corporation argued that the "substantial continuity"
test, on which the district court had based its decision, had been
invalidated in United States v. Bestfoods and that it should not be liable
under CERCLA. The Eighth Circuit noted "Bestfoods do6s not directly
address corporate successor liability, and consequently, there may yet be
contexts in which the substantial continuity test could survive." However,
the court decided that since the facts in the instant case did not satisfy the
substantial continuity test, it need not address that question. The proper
application of the substantial continuity test requires the court to consider
whether "CERCLA-defeating conduct" is present. However, the district
court ruled on the corporate successor liability without finding that the
purchase by the successor corporation was an attempt to avoid CERCLA
liability. On this ground, the court held that the successor corporation of
the company that purchased the operating assets of the predecessor
corporation that had engaged in mixing and repackaging of herbicides on
contaminated property, but did not purchase property itself, was not
subject to liability on the basis of substantial continuity.
Another party made an argument that the successor corporation
still remains liable under traditional exceptions for imposing successor
liability. However, the court rejected this claim as there was no express
agreement by the successor corporation to assume a predecessor
corporation's liabilities, there was no continuity of shareholders, and there
was no evidence that the successor knew of any potential CERCLA
liability.
MIN CHUNG LEE
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Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
479 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2007)
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council ("SEACC") appealed a
grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the
District of Alaska in favor of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") and the U.S. Forest Service in regards to the Corps' issuance of
a permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act to Coeur Alaska, Inc. for the
discharge of mine tailings from its mill operation into a lake in the
Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska. In August 2006, the district
court entered judgment denying SEACC an injunction to prevent the
implementation of the Coeur Alaska plan to dump the tailings into the
Lower Slate Lake. SEACC appealed three days later. Although Coeur
Alaska commenced building a temporary coffer dam after the district court
judgment, due to Coeur Alaska's knowledge that an appeal was pending,
the Ninth Circuit entered an injunction pending appeal that prohibited
Coeur Alaska, the Corps, and the Forest Service from proceeding with the
construction of facilities to implement the plan to dispose of the tailings
into the lake.
The Corps issued a permit to Coeur Alaska under § 404 of the
Clean Water Act to discharge approximately 210,000 gallons of slurry,
including 1,444 tons of mine tailings, per day from its froth-flotation mill
operation at the Kensington Gold Mine into Lower Slate Lake, a 23-acre
lake in Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska. The discharge would
raise the bottom of the lake 50 feet and nearly triple the surface area.
Nearly all the fish and most other aquatic life would be killed from being
covered by the discharge. Coeur Alaska began building a 90-foot high,
500-foot long dam at the lake's outfall point to prepare the lake for the
disposal of tailings and the expansion of the lake's surface area. After the
appeal was filed, Coeur Alaska built a temporary "coffer dam" and began
construction of a 38-foot high earthen dam behind the coffer dam. Coeur
Alaska's long-term plan also included the construction of a diversion
ditch. The Ninth Circuit halted further construction at the site pending the
outcome of this appeal.
In November 2006, Coeur Alaska filed a motion to vacate the
injunction, raising concerns about the possible effect of weather on the
integrity of the dam. The Ninth Circuit, in denying the motion, held the
428

"Corps' permit to Coeur Alaska violated the Clean Water Act and that the
construction would adversely affect the environment by destroying trees
and other vegetation, and by killing aquatic life." The Corps, because of
conditional approval of Coeur Alaska's plan, then sought the Ninth
Circuit's authorization of a plan to construct a diversion ditch known as
the Western Interceptor Ditch ("WID").
On appeal the issue was the integrity of the temporary coffer dam
that Coeur Alaska rushed to construct in the twenty days between the
district court judgment and the injunction. The Ninth Circuit examined
Coeur Alaska's motives to remedy any perceived weather problems
created by the construction of the dam.
The Ninth Circuit found Coeur Alaska's ditch plan violated the
injunction. The injunction prohibited construction activities that included
cutting trees, building roads, clearing vegetation, and building dams or
other structures, among others. Coeur Alaska's ditch plan required cutting
trees on 7.6 acres or forested land, building a 30-foot wide road,
excavating and digging a 3000-foot ditch, along with other violations.
Coeur Alaska then sought permission to reinforce the coffer dam so it
would not breach. However, the Ninth Circuit denied this motion,
reiterating that if Coeur Alaska were allowed to begin preparing the site
for disposal prior to the court's resolution on appeal, the plan would not
maintain the status quo, but would allow Coeur Alaska to begin working
to a significant extent on its overall plan, which was not consistent with
the injunction.
The Ninth Circuit then announced its intentions to reverse the
district court, vacated the permits and the Record of Decision authorizing
the use of Lower Slate Lake as a disposal facility, and remanded to the
district court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of
SEACC. The court found that the Corps violated the Clean Water Act in
issuing its permit to Coeur Alaska for use of the Lower Slate Lake as a
disposal site. Although the discharge from the mill operation met the
Corps' current definition of "fill material" because it would have the effect
of raising the bottom elevation of the lake, the EPA issued performance
standards that prohibits discharges from froth-flotation mills into waters of
the United States. The Ninth Circuit found this regulation applied to Coeur
Alaska's mill. Although the Corps' definition of "fill material" and the
EPA's performance standards conflict, the EPA's standards apply to all
429
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discharges. The performance standard governs because it is more specific;
it applies precisely to forth-flotation mills. Also, statements made by the
Corps and the EPA during the course of evaluating Coeur Alaska's
permits demonstrate that the EPA's performance standard for the frothflotation mills was to apply in this case. Due to the court's intention to
reverse and vacate the Record of Decision and permits, the Ninth Circuit
held that all construction-related activities implementing Coeur Alaska's
plan to dispose of tailings into Lower Slate Lake should cease.

NIKKI A. MULLINS
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National Parks Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
480 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2007)
The Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") is a public power
company created by Congress, which owns and operates the power plant
at issue in this case. The plant, Bull Run, is located in Clinton, Tennessee.
All emissions produced by the plant must comply with Tennessee's state
implementation plan ("SIP"), which is the system used to enforce the
EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). Tennessee's
SIP specifically requires polluters to apply for separate permits to
construct and operate air pollution facilities, such as the Bull Run plant.
This helps to regulate any modifications to polluting facilities or changes
in their operation that may lead to significantly increased air pollution.
In 1988, the TVA made substantial modifications to its Bull Run
plant by replacing several thousand feet of tubing inside the boiler used to
produce electricity. The EPA noted, eleven years later, that the
modification to the boiler constituted a modification requiring a
construction permit under Tennessee's SIP. The SIP also imposes an
ongoing duty on polluters to apply best available control technology
("BACT"), a limitation normally found within a construction permit, even
when they fail to obtain a construction permit. TVA's failures to apply the
BACT and obtain a construction permit were the violations in question
brought before the Eastern District Court of Tennessee in 2001. After a
stay of proceedings, the district court held in 2004 that because TVA's
violations took place in 1988, the action brought by the National Parks
Conservation Association and other environmental organizations was
time-barred under the five-year statute of limitations.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Tennessee's SIP permitted
application and issuance of a construction permit after the fact where a
modification or source was constructed without such a permit. They
alleged that this ongoing duty to ensure appropriate emissions, despite an
initial failure to do so, constituted actionable failures continuously
extending the point in which the limitation period began to accrue. On the
contrary, TVA argued that the SIP only prohibited construction without a
permit; therefore, the statute began to run in 1988 and expired in 1993.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the TVA and the district court by holding
that the "case presents a series of discrete violations rather than a single
431
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violation that may or may not be 'continuing' in nature." Therefore the
failures to obtain a construction permit for the modification to the boiler
and failure to apply BACT were actionable because the violations renewed
each day the plant operated. The circuit court held that violations
extending back five years before the date the suit was filed in 2001 were
actionable and within the statute of limitations. The district court's
decision was reversed and the cause remanded.
The dissenting judge disagreed with the view that the case
involved continuous violations renewing each day the plant operated. This
opinion emphasized the distinction between the operating permit, which
the TVA had obtained, and the construction permit required prior to the
modification in 1988. The dissent termed the TVA's continuous failure to
obtain the permit as a series of discrete harms rather than a series of
discrete violations. As an example, the judge compared the situation to
contracting with a carpenter to repair a roof. The carpenter's failure to
repair the roof would be a single violation, and every time it rains there
would be a harm. The carpenter cannot breach the contract every time in
rains; therefore, no new or discrete violation would occur. The dissent
referred to the failure to obtain a construction permit as a single violation
and the failure to apply BACT as the harm resulting thereof. Under this
view, the statute of limitations would have expired in 1993 for the
construction permit claim and a separate claim should be filed for the
continuous failure to apply BACT.
RYAN WESTHOFF
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Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") makes liable among others any person who
arranges for disposal of hazardous substances by any other party or entity,
at any facility from which there is a release of a hazardous substance. But,
what happens when the hazardous substance is released by a person
outside the boundaries of the United States and settles in the waters of the
United States? This question went long unanswered until the 9 th Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled on a case involving a Canadian company facing
this exact situation.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. ("Teck") is a Canadian company that
owns and operates a lead/zinc smelter in Trail ("Trail Smelter"), British
Columbia. From 1906 to 1995 Teck generated and disposed of hazardous
materials in both liquid and solid form into the Columbia River. These
wastes, known as "slag," include the heavy metals arsenic, cadmium,
copper, mercury, lead, and zinc. Up until 1995 the Trail Smelter released
as much as 145,000 tons of waste into the Columbia River Annually.
These discharges were made in Canada, but the EPA determined
that the discharges eventually flowed downstream to settle in the waters of
the United States. The Trail Smelter is determined to be a significant
contributor to the contamination of the Upper Columbia River and Lake
Roosevelt. The physical and chemical decay of slag has been found to be
an ongoing process that releases arsenic, cadmium, copper, zinc, and lead
after it has settled back into the environment. This release could cause
harm to human health and the environment.
In 1999 the EPA began a site assessment of waters containing slag
from the Trail Smelter. This assessment was done at the request of the
Colville Tribes under § 9605 of CERCLA. The EPA found from this
assessment contamination that included "heavy metals such as arsenic,
cadmium, copper, lead, mercury and zinc." The EPA also observed the
presence of slag and in 2003 determined that the Upper Columbia River
Site was eligible to be placed on the National Priority List ("NPL").
Eventually the EPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order ("Order")
against Teck.
The order if enforced would require Teck to conduct a remedial
investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) which is meant to assess the site
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conditions and evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a
remedy. The EPA issued the order in December of 2003 when its
negotiations with Teck Cominco American, Inc. (a wholly-owned
American subsidiary of Teck) broke down over the amount of information
needed for the EPA to select an appropriate remedy for the contamination.
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. the 9 th Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington's 2004 decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss
the citizen suit seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that Teck violated the
order issued by the EPA against Teck, and (2) enforcement of the order.
The district court held that there was federal subject matter jurisdiction
since the claim arose under CERCLA.
The district court also devoted much of its opinion to the
evaluation of whether the suit involved impermissible extraterritorial
application of CERCLA requiring the suit to be dismissed for the
plaintiffs failure to state a claim. In this discussion the district court
determined that CERCLA expresses a clear intent by Congress to remedy
domestic conditions within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. and
therefore extraterritorial application of CERCLA would be appropriate in
this case.
The 9 th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the District court was
correct in its interpretation of CERCLA but differed from the lower court
on the issue of extraterritorial application of CERCLA. The Court of
appeals found that the release of hazardous waste from the slag into the
Upper Columbia River was actually a domestic release and therefore
required no analysis of extraterritorial application of CERCLA. The court
reasoned that the leaching of hazardous waste constituted a release from
the slag which comes from the Trail Smelter facility and such a release is a
domestic release under CERCLA.
This is the first suit filed against a foreign company under
CERCLA. In a world that is growing extensively into a global business
community this case is important to all sectors of the business community.
Perhaps this case will be most important to companies and their insurers
who do business along the Mexican or Canadian boarder. This is so
because of the joint and several liability structure of CERCLA and the
importance of potentially responsible parties being able to attach liability
for contamination to those who contribute to the contamination.
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Because of the 9 th Circuit Court of Appeal's expansive
interpretation of what constitutes a release under CERCLA one can
recognize how far this analysis might go to included releases that "rerelease" hazardous waste once they are upon U.S. territory. Teck filed a
petition for Certiorari on February 27, 2007 to seek the high court's ruling
on this Canadian company's liability under U.S. law when it is in
compliance with Canadian law. Teck claims that the 9 th Circuit ruling
would usurp the foreign-relations powers of the political branches of the
United States and Canada and could provoke retaliatory actions against
U.S. interests by Canada or its courts. These assertions make it a hard call
as to whether a company that has contributed pollution to U.S. waterways
for almost 100 years should be forced under U.S. law to contribute to the
clean up of the hazardous waste it contributed.
KRISTOL WHATLEY
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Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250
(11th Cir. 2007)
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition ("the Coalition"), an
Alabama non-profit corporation, and other plaintiffs appealed a decision
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama which
approved a decision by the Fish and Wildlife Service ("the Service") to list
the Alabama sturgeon as an "endangered species" and required the Service
to also list a "critical habitat" for the sturgeon. The Coalition made three
claims in their appeal to vacate the Service's listing: that the Service failed
to consider the relevant factors in reaching the listing decision; the Service
failed to designate the critical habitat of the Alabama sturgeon when it
listed the fish on the Endangered Species List; and the Service exceeded
the power granted to it in the Commerce Clause. The district court granted
the Service's motion for summary judgment, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
The Coalition made three arguments in the claim that the Service
failed to consider all the relevant factors in reaching its listing decision:
the Service used older, "morphological taxonomy" instead of modern
genetics; that the Service cherry-picked its scientific evidence; and the
Service wrongfully interfered with the research of one of its own
scientists. The Service used taxonomy evidence to aid it in deciding
whether or not the Alabama sturgeon was a distinct species of fish from
the more-abundant shovelnose sturgeon. The Service used morphological
taxonomy because that method included other non-genetic factors in
identifying separate species, but it also looked at mitochondrial
cytochrome b gene evidence, the "d-loop" of the sturgeons' mitochondrial
DNA, and nuclear DNA. In those studies, small but consistent differences
were found. In its final rule, however, the Service doubted that using
genetic evidence could definitively resolve the issue of whether the
Alabama sturgeon is a separate species, and the court deferred to the
Service's decision not to exclusively rely on it.
The Coalition also argued that the Service failed to consider all the
relevant factors by ignoring scientific data. Specifically, the data that the
Coalition thought the Service ignored was a single article in a statistics
journal, not a zoological, ichthyological, or systematics journal, and two
other studies which were not available for peer review in the ichthyolitical
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community. The court understood that there would be differences of
opinion, given the nature of taxonomy, and then said that disagreements in
the field do not preclude agency decision making. Although that rule does
not allow an agency to arbitrarily dismiss relevant scientific data, the court
did not see such abuses by the Service. Instead, the court said the
Service's decision was consistent with relevant professional organizations
and was supported by scientific, peer-edited studies.
Third, the Coalition argued that the Service failed to consider all
the relevant factors by interfering with the research of one of its own
scientists. That researcher had been contacted by a scientist employed by
the Coalition; when the Service heard that one of its own researchers was
conducting studies for interested parties in the rule making, the Service
stopped the researcher from further contacting the Coalition. The court
held there was no wrongful interference by the Service because the
Service was actually cluing the researcher into a key fact that he didn't
know: the scientist wasn't a disinterested party. Furthermore, the court
held that there was no evidence that the Service influenced the outcome of
the study that its researcher was conducting. Therefore, the court held that
the Service did consider all the relevant factors.
The Coalition's second claim against the Service was that Service
failed to designate a critical habitat for the Alabama sturgeon, the remedy
for which the Coalition argues should be vacating the Service's final rule.
The District Court instead ordered the Service to have a proposed rule
designating a critical habitat by May 14, 2006, and a final rule by
November 16, 2006. According to the Coalition, vacating the Final Rule
was the proper remedy because failure to propose and designate the
species and the habitat at the same time would undermine the final listing
decision. The Coalition argued that giving notice of the proposed critical
habitat designation could encourage more people to participate in the
Service's public comment process. The court, however, noted that under
the Environmental Species Act, the Service could propose the critical
habitat after closing the period for public comment on the proposed
endangered species listing. The court stated that the purpose of the statute
was not undermined by its interpretation because the purpose of the statute
was to prevent the Service from indefinitely putting off the designation of
a critical habitat for listed species.
The Coalition's third claim against the Service was that Congress
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exceeded the power granted to it under the Commerce Clause by
authorizing protection of an intrastate, noncommercial species. At issue
was whether regulating the Alabama sturgeon was an activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce. The Service pointed out,
however, that three Circuit Courts of Appeals since United States v. Lopez
have upheld the constitutionality of Congress authorizing the Service to
list a purely intrastate species as endangered under the Endangered
Species Act, and that no circuit court has held to the contrary. The court
agreed with those courts that the Endangered Species Act bears a
substantial relation to commerce. It pointed to the value of such species in
illegal markets, and the value of a species' mere presence in its natural
habitat for hunting, fishing, and tourism.
After ruling against the Coalition's three points on appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Its decision
kept the Alabama sturgeon listed as an endangered species and required
the Service to propose a critical habitat for the sturgeon.
JOHN H.A. GRIESEDIECK
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STATE COURTS
Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.,

_

S.W.3d __, 2007 WL 827762

(Mo. 2007)
The Fluor Corporation operates the Doe Run lead smelter in
Herculaneum, Missouri. Every year the smelter emits large quantities of
lead into the local environment, which results in higher levels of lead and
other toxins in the air in and around Herculaneum. Neither side disputed
that lead exposure can often result in latent injuries, in which the physical
effects are not identifiable for several years.
The plaintiff filed a petition asserting she is a member of a class of
over 200 children in and around Herculaneum, that have been exposed to
toxic emissions from the smelter. The petition alleged negligence, strict
liability, and private nuisance. The plaintiff sought class status because she
sought compensatory damages in order to establish a medical monitoring
program for class members. The purpose of the medical monitoring
program would be to provide ongoing diagnostic testing to determine
whether the exposure to lead and other toxins has been caused or is in the
process of causing an injury or illness.
The circuit court denied the class certification. It held that
individual issues will necessarily predominate over common issues in this
case and that the case would not be efficiently addressed on a class wide
basis. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the circuit court abused its
discretion by incorrectly assuming that a present physical injury is a
necessary element of a medical monitoring claim.
The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held that the circuit court
abused its discretion in denying the class certification. The court first
noted that if there were a requirement for a present physical injury, the
claim would essentially be extinguished and the plaintiffs would be barred
from a full recovery. The court pointed out that the correct standard that
should have been applied is that a plaintiff can obtain damages for medical
monitoring upon a showing that the plaintiff has a significantly increased
risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what would be the case
absent of the exposure. Then the plaintiff must show that medical
monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in
order to properly diagnose the warning signs of the disease. The Missouri
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Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the circuit
court incorrectly required that there needed to be a present physical injury.
WILLIAM GuST
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